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ABSTRACT
We consider Schelling’s bounded neighborhood model (BNM) of unorganized
segregation, from the perspective of modern dynamical systems theory. We
carry out a complete quantitative analysis of the system for linear tolerance
schedules. We derive a fully predictive model and associate each term with a
social meaning. We recover and generalize Schelling’s qualitative results.
For the case of unlimited population movement, we derive exact for-
mulae for regions in parameter space where stable integrated population
mixes can occur, and show how neighborhood tipping can be explained in
terms of basins of attraction.
When population movement is limited, we derive exact criteria for the
occurrence of new population mixes.
For nonlinear tolerance schedules, we illustrate our approach with
numerical simulations.
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Models of segregation
Segregation is “the action or state of setting someone or something apart from others or the enforced
separation of different racial groups in a country, community, or establishment” (collectively known
as organized segregation), or it can occur as the result of the “interplay of individual choices” (known
as unorganized segregation) (Schelling, 1969, 1971). In terms of societal, political, and economic
outcomes, segregation is widely regarded as undesirable. It is the opposite of integration.
Schelling’s spatial proximity model (SPM) (Schelling, 1969, 1971) was the first model of unorga-
nized segregation. It is a discrete-time spatial (agent-based) model that uses a checkerboard frame-
work in which cells (representing physical units such as a house in a street or a bed in a dormitory)
are occupied — or not — by equal numbers of two different types of agents. At each time step,
agents remain where they are unless the proportion of agents of the other type in their neighborhood
exceeds a given threshold, in which case they move to a vacant cell. Many variants of this model
exist, including different group sizes and tolerance demands (Singh, Vainchtein, & Weiss, 2011),
different methods of relocation (Laurie & Jaggi, 2003; Pollicott & Weiss, 2001; Zhang, 2009), non-
lattice topologies (Henry, Prałat, & Zhang, 2011; Pancs & Vriend, 2007), and simulations based on
demographic and geographical data (Benenson, 1999; Benenson, 1998; Benenson, Omer, & Hatna,
2002; Benenson, 2013; Hatna & Benenson, 2012). The emergent behavior of all such models is the
same: even in highly-tolerant populations, a small preference for familiarity in one’s immediate
neighbours is sufficient to induce geographical segregation (Fossett & Waren, 2005; Fossett, 2006;
Henry et al., 2011; Pancs & Vriend, 2007).
In the same papers, Schelling (Schelling, 1969, 1971) also introduced the bounded neighborhoodmodel
(BNM), which has been seldom pursued in the literature (Clark, 1991; Dodson, 2014). It is the purpose of
this article to examine Schelling’s BNM within the framework of modern dynamical systems theory
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(Strogatz, 1994). Starting from Schelling’s idea of a tolerance schedule, we derive continuous time
equations that describe the evolution of the populations of two agents in a neighborhood. We show
that the growth of one population is affected by the intrinsic popularity and finite size of the neighbour-
hood as well as by the presence of the other population. With our fully predictive model, we recover
Schelling’s results analytically, generalize them, and give some new results.
Schelling’s bounded neighborhood model (BNM)
In Schelling’s bounded neighborhood model (BNM) (Schelling, 1969, 1971), the population is divided
into two types. Both populations can have different tolerance limits. A neighborhood is like a district
within a city, or a workplace/social group. An individual in that neighborhood moves out if they are not
happy with the populationmix there. In the neighborhood, everymember of the population is concerned
about the distribution of the types of agents, not with any particular configuration.
Let XðtÞ  0 and YðtÞ  0 denote the density of two population types inhabiting the neighborhood,
as a function of time t. Note that Schelling (Schelling, 1969, 1971) refers toW (Whites) and B (Blacks).
In the neighborhood, tolerance limits are allocated to a given population type via a tolerance
schedule. The X-type tolerance schedule RXðXÞ describes the minimum ratio X=Y required in order
for all of the X population to remain in that neighborhood. A similar function RYðYÞ describes the
tolerance of the Y-type population. Schelling (Schelling, 1969, 1971) made the following assumptions:
(1) The neighborhood is preferred over other locations: populations of both type will enter/
remain unless tolerance conditions are violated.
(2) The tolerance schedule is specific to the location being studied.
(3) Each member of the population is aware of the ratio of population types within the
neighborhood at the moment the decision is made to enter/remain/leave.
(4) There is no lower bound on tolerance, that is, no population insists on the presence of the
opposing type.
(5) Tolerance schedules are monotone decreasing, that is, the more tolerant population is first
to enter and last to leave.
Schelling’s initial example of a tolerance schedule is linear, as shown in Figure 1. In this article, we
take units of population density such that Xmax ¼ 1 ¼ kYmax for some k> 0 (Schelling initially sets
Xmax ¼ 100 and Ymax ¼ 50, so k ¼ 2). The most tolerant member of the X-population can abide a
Y : X ratio of a : 1, half of the X-population can tolerate a ratio of a=2 : 1, and the least tolerant
member of the X-population can abide no members of the Y-population. Likewise, the most tolerant
member of the Y-population can abide a X : Y ratio of b : 1, etc. We have a; b> 0, and we can
assume that k  1, so that Y denotes the minority population.
Each population has its own tolerance limit. For the X-population, this is the value of Y-popula-
tion above which the X-population will leave and below which there will be an X-population influx.
These limits correspond to Y=X ¼ RXðXÞ and X=Y ¼ RYðYÞ. Therefore, for linear tolerance
schedules, these limits are parabolas in the ðX;YÞ plane, given by
Y ¼ XRXðXÞ ¼ aXð1 XÞ (1)
X ¼ YRYðYÞ ¼ bYð1 kYÞ (2)
Figure 1(b) is Schelling’s own sketch ((Schelling, 1971), Figure 18, see also (Schelling, 1969),
Figure 1) of these parabolas, together with arrows that give an indication of the qualitative dynamics
that arise. In modern dynamical systems nomenclature, Figure 1(b) is a plot of the system dynamics
in the ðW;BÞ phase plane. In our notation, Figure 1(b) corresponds to a ¼ b ¼ k ¼ 2.
Schelling explained Figure 1(b) in terms of static viability and dynamics of movement and
identified two stable equilibria.
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● Static viability: Any point that lies within the area of overlap of the two parabolas denotes a
statically viable combination of the W and B populations. Any other point between the W-para-
bola and the W-axis represents a mixture of W and B where all the W, but not all the B, will
remain. Similarly, any point outside the area of overlap but between the B-parabola and the B-axis
represents a mixture where all the B, but not all the W, will remain. Any point outside both
parabolas denotes a mixture of W and B where neither all of W nor all or B are satisfied.
● Dynamics of movement: Schelling argued qualitatively that outside the area of overlap, some of
W or B are unhappy, so they will move. The area of overlap itself is attractive and so will lead to
an influx of people and hence instability.
● Stable equilibria: Schelling argued that, for the example in Figure 1(b), there are two stable
equilibria, both corresponding to a segregated population: the area would contain either all W
and no B or it would be all B and no W (these are the points of intersection of the parabola
with the axes). The statically viable points are not stable, in this case.
Schelling gave another example ((Schelling, 1971), Figure 19, see also (Schelling, 1969), Figure 2),
for different parameter values, which resulted in an integrated population. Segregation is also possible
in this second case, but the eventual population mix depends on the initial values of XðtÞ;YðtÞ.
Schelling considered the following extensions of the BNM:
(1) A limit on the number of one of the two types of population, but not both.
(2) A limit on the X-population and a limit on the Y-population.
(3) A limit on the total population.
(4) A range of tolerance schedules.
(5) Limiting the ratio X=Y .
(6) The effect of perturbations in the system, such as when a group of one type enters or leaves
the area. When such behavior changes the equilibrium state to which the system converges,
this is known as neighborhood tipping (Schelling, 1971, p. 181).
In this article, we consider 1; 2; 4, and 6 in detail, owing to their analytic tractability. We give
analytic criteria to determine whether equilibria are stable or not and show how limiting a popula-
tion can introduce new, stable, equilibria. Extensions 3 and 5 can be considered numerically, using
the same methods.
Figure 1. Schelling’s first example: linear tolerance schedules and their translation into the (W, B) phase plane.
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Methods
Schelling’s arguments are qualitative. But modern dynamical systems theory (Strogatz, 1994) pro-
vides the ideal framework to develop a fully predictive model that we call a Schelling dynamical
system. Suppose we have an arbitrary dynamical system in two time-dependent population variables
XðtÞ;YðtÞ of the form
dX
dt ; _X ¼ FðX;YÞ
dY
dt ; _Y ¼ GðX;YÞ
(3)
Then the nullclines of (3) are given by the curves FðX;YÞ ¼ 0 (when there is no growth in the
X-population) and GðX;YÞ ¼ 0 (when there is no growth in the Y-population). Nullclines corre-
spond to curves in ðX;YÞ-phase plane with the same (zero) slope. The intersection of nullclines gives
the equilibria (or fixed points) of (3), whose stability can then be examined.
Our observation is that the parabolas in Figure 1(b) correspond to the X- and Y-nullclines
of a dynamical system within the given neighborhood. In addition, the lines X ¼ 0 and Y ¼ 0
are nullclines. Then the Schelling dynamical system for a linear tolerance schedule is given by
_X ¼ aXð1 XÞ  Y½ X
_Y ¼ bYð1 kYÞ  X½ Y (4)
We note that (4) is very similar to a Lotka-Volterra system (Strogatz, 1994), where growth and decay
terms compete to determine the overall population dynamics. Both a and b have units T1. Also (4)
automatically satisfies Assumption 1 of section 2 (see discussion below).
Note that we can rescale time t^ ¼ at and set Y ¼ aZ. Then (4) becomes
_X ¼ Xð1 XÞ  Z½ X
_Z ¼ βZð1 αZÞ  X½ Z (5)
where
α;ak > 0; β;ab > 0: (6)
Figure 2. Equation (7) has three real roots in the colored area and one real root outside (and above the dotted line b = 1). The upper
branch is the curve b = b+, which has a vertical asymptote at a = 4. The lower branch is the curve b = b − . The apex of the colored region
is the point P: (a, b) = (ak, ab) = (3, 9). Below the dashed line b = 1, equation (7) has one real root Xe < 0. The color scale shows det(J)
evaluated at the equilibrium point corresponding to the intermediate real root of equation (7), where this root exists.
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We shall study the dynamics of (5) for arbitrary values of α; β, referring to (4) and a; b; k whenever
necessary. Mathematically, it is more natural to work with the ðX;ZÞ variables. But practically, we
are interested in the behavior of the ðX;YÞ variables, as was Schelling. So we will alternate between
their usage, depending on the context. Our methods are analytical where possible and numerical
where necessary.
Unlimited numbers
We begin with the case referred to by Schelling as unlimited numbers. Here the neighborhood can
take up to the maximum amount of both populations, and so we can have Xmax ¼ 1 or Ymax ¼ 1k ,
ðZmax ¼ 1αÞ within the neighborhood. We then ask:
• What are the equilibria of (5)?
• Under what conditions are the equilibria of (5) stable?
• How segregated/integrated are such stable equilibria?
• For which initial values of X and Z does the system converge to a stable equilibrium, for fixed
values of α; β?
Equilibria
Equlibria, or steady state solutions, correspond to _X ¼ _Z ¼ 0. So ðX;ZÞ ¼ ðXe;ZeÞ ¼
ð0; 0Þ; ð1; 0Þ; ð0; 1αÞ are equilibria of (4). These correspond, respectively, to: a) the neighborhood is
empty of both populations, b) the neighborhood consists of the X-population only, and c) the
neighborhood consists of the Z-population only.
There is also the possibility of other equilibria, corresponding to the intersection of the nullclines
Z ¼ Xð1 XÞ and X ¼ βZð1 αZÞ, which happens when there is at least one real root ðX;ZÞ ¼
ðXe;ZeÞ of the cubic equation
X3e þ a2X2e þ a1Xe þ a0 ¼ 0 (7)
where Ze ¼ Xeð1 XeÞ and we have set
a2; 2; a1; 1þ α
α
; a0;
1 β
αβ
: (8)
We are interested in real (positive) values of ðXe;ZeÞ. A cubic equation with real coefficients such as (7)
has three either one real root and two complex roots or three real roots. To distinguish between the two
possibilities, we must calculate the discriminant D of the cubic in (7). Then ifD> 0, (7) has one real root,
and if D< 0, (7) has three real roots. In (7), D ¼ a22a21  4a31  4a32a0  27a20 þ 18a2a1a0, so we have
D ¼ ½ð4 αÞβ
2 þ ð4α2  18αÞβþ 27α
108α3β2
(9)
and hence (7) has three real roots when
βðαÞ< β< βþðαÞ (10)
where
βðαÞ ¼
9α 2α2  2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
αðα 3Þ3
q
4 α (11)
provided
α> 3: (12)
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Thus, we will have three real roots when ðα; βÞ;ðak; abÞ lies in the shaded region of Figure 2.
In terms of the original parameters a; b; k, we will have three real roots for equation (7) when
bðakÞ< b< bþðakÞ (13)
where
bðakÞ ¼
9ak 2a2k2  2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
akðak 3Þ3
q
að4 akÞ (14)
provided
ak> 3: (15)
Note that when β;ab  1, we have only one real root Xe  0, which is unphysical.
Stability analysis
The stability of a equilibrium is determined by the eigenvalues λ1; λ2 of the Jacobian for the system
evaluated at that equilibrium. The Jacobian of (4) is given by
JðX;ZÞ ¼ Xð2 3XÞ  Z XZ βZð2 3αZÞ  X
 
(16)
For the equilibrium ðXe;ZeÞ ¼ ð0; 0Þ, we find that the eigenvalues of Jð0; 0Þ are both zero. So the
stability of this equilibrium is determined by the type of perturbation. But since it corresponds to an
empty neighborhood, we focus attention on the remaining equilibria.
We next consider the segregated equilibria ð1; 0Þ and ð0; 1αÞ. In both cases, both eigenvalues are
negative. For ðXe;ZeÞ ¼ ð1; 0Þ, the (degenerate) eigenvalues are  1,  1. This equilibrium is a stable
(degenerate, or improper) node. The eigenvector is the X-axis. Hence, the importance of taking Y ¼
0ðZ ¼ 0Þ as a nullcline. If the initial population consists of members of the X-population only, then they
will attract more members of the same type until ðX;ZÞ ¼ ðXe;ZeÞ ¼ ð1; 0Þ, that is, the neighborhood is
filled with the X-population. For the other equilibrium ðXe;ZeÞ ¼ ð0; 1αÞ, the eigenvalues are  1α ,  βα .
This equilibrium is a stable node. It has eigenvectors spanned by ð1; 11βÞ and the line X ¼ 0. Hence, the
importance of taking X ¼ 0 as a nullcline.
Let us now consider the equilibrium given by the intermediate solution ðXe;ZeÞ of the cubic in
(7), when 3 real solutions exist. Analytically, this case is a lot harder than the others, and so we
present our results numerically. For each point ðα; βÞ in Figure 2, we calculate Xe. Then, since
Ze ¼ Xeð1 XeÞ, we can evaluate JðXe;ZeÞ using (16). We plot detðJÞ as a function of ðα; βÞ in
Figure 2. We have detðJÞ> 0 in the whole coloured region, that is, where (7) has 3 distinct real roots.
Since detðJÞ ¼ λ1λ2, both eigenvalues are either positive or negative here. Simple inspection shows
that both eigenvalues are negative, and so the solution is stable. Similarly, we can show that the other
2 real solutions to (7) have detðJÞ< 0 and so are both saddles. Outside the coloured region, we have a
single real solution with detðJÞ< 0 so the single real solution is a saddle for these values of ðα; βÞ.
Phase portraits and bifurcation diagrams
Figure 3 shows phase portraits, now in the ðX;YÞ plane, for different values of ða; b; kÞ, together with
the corresponding values of ðα; βÞ. Setting ða; b; kÞ ¼ ð2; 2; 2Þ, as in Schelling’s initial example (our
Figure 1(b)), we obtain the phase portrait shown in Figure 3(a). We are in the unshaded area of Figure 2.
We have the same qualitative behavior as in Figure 1(b). Figure 3(a) also contains quantitative
information about the local direction of movement of the population mix. The bigger the arrow, the
faster the movement. So we see that, in this case, movement toward a segregated X-population is
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much faster than toward a segregated Y-population. Movement in the neighborhood of the fourth
equilibrium (a saddle) is almost imperceptible.
For ða; b; kÞ ¼ ð2; 8; 2Þ, we are in the shaded region of Figure 2. The dynamics are shown in
Figure 3(b), where the saddle has now replaced by two saddles and a stable node, as a result of a
saddle node (fold) bifurcation at β ¼ β (see Figure 4).
For ða; b; kÞ ¼ ð1; 8; 2Þ, we return to the unshaded region of Figure 2. We see the dynamics in
Figure 3(c), which is qualitatively similar to Figure 3(b). Finally in Figure 3(d), when
ða; b; kÞ ¼ ð1; 1; 2Þ, we have ðα; βÞ ¼ ð2; 1Þ, which corresponds to the case when the cubic equation
(7) only has the trivial solution Xe ¼ 0.
What happens as we cross the curves β ¼ β in Figure 2? Figure 4(a) shows the fold bifurcations that
occur at β and βþ when 3< α< 4. The black lines correspond to (unstable) saddles and the green line
to a stable node. So if we fix α such that 3< α< 4 and then vary β, there is no stable integrated
population mix for 1< β< β. Then for β < β< βþ, we can have a stable integrated population mix,
although that all depends on the initial values of X;Y (see Figure 5). Finally, for β > βþ, we lose that
stable solution via another fold bifurcation, and the remaining solution is unstable.
In Figure 4(b), when α> 4, we have a single fold at β. So if we now fix α in this range and vary β,
there is no stable integrated population mix for 1< β< β. But for β > β, we can have a stable
integrated population mix, again depending on the initial values of X;Y (see Figure 5).
It is only possible to have an integrated population mix when α> 3 from (12) (i.e., ak> 3 from
(15)). In socio-economic terms, if k ¼ 1 for example, this result means that there must exist some
population of each type that is content to live in up to a 3 : 1 minority in order for a stable mixed
Figure 3. Phase portraits corresponding to different points in Figure 2. Stable equilibria are shown as filled circles and saddle
points as open circles.
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state to be possible. So criterion (15) is a generalisation to arbitrary k of Schelling’s observation
(Schelling, 1971, p. 172) that “For straight-line tolerance schedules and equal numbers of the two
colors, there is no intersection of the two parabolas unless the tolerance schedules have vertical
intercepts of 3:0, with median tolerance of 1:5.”
Figure 4. Bifurcation diagrams showing saddles (black) and stable nodes (green). At least one saddle point exists whenever b > 1.
Figure 5. Blue regions correspond to the basin of attraction of X-only equilibrium (1, 0), and red regions to the basin of attraction
of the Y-only equilibrium (0, 1k). White denotes the basin of attraction of the stable mixed state (integrated population mix)
obtained from (7) when it exists.
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Neighborhood tipping and basins of attraction
When discussing the time-evolution of the BNM, Schelling (Schelling, 1971, p. 181) considers the
possibility that “a recognizable new minority enters a neighbourhood in sufficient numbers to cause
the earlier residents to begin evacuating.” In dynamical systems terms, this means that a perturbation
of the systemmay give rise to a different equilibrium point. In social science terms, this phenomenon is
known as neighborhood tipping, which we now consider within the framework of dynamical systems.
The basin of attraction of a (necessarily stable) equilibrium ðXe;YeÞ is the set of initial conditions
ðX0;Y0Þ that lead to ðXe;YeÞ, under the action of the dynamical system. Unstable equilibria can not
have basins of attraction (although the stable manifolds of saddles do divide phase space). Since our
dynamical system is deterministic (no noise), each initial condition belongs to only one basin of
attraction. Neighborhood tipping occurs when a perturbation moves the initial state of a system
from one basin of attraction to another.
In Schelling’s work, it is (tacitly) assumed that tipping points correspond to the boundaries of the
parabolas (nullclines) of Figure 1(b). But this can not be the case owing to the presence of saddle
points. We have computed the basins of attraction for the stable equilibria. Figure 5 shows these
areas of phase space for the cases given in Figure 3.
Limiting individual populations
Schelling (Schelling, 1971), Figure 22, p. 173. stated that “limiting the numbers allowed to be present
in the [neighbourhood] can sometimes produce a stable mixture.” We now show exactly how such
stable mixtures can be achieved.
New equilibria
Let us restrict the X-population to a maximum value of u, where u 2 ð0; 1Þ, as shown in Figure 6.
The Z-population is not restricted, and so the corresponding maximum tolerance limit of the
X-population is unchanged at ðX;ZÞ ¼ ð β4α ; 12αÞ. When the X-population is at its limiting value
X ¼ u, we have Z ¼ Zu;uð1 uÞ. Then it is clear that we need to have
u<
β
4α
for the limiting of the X-population to have any effect. Then the new population mixtures will
correspond to the intersections Z ¼ Z of the line X ¼ u with the parabola X ¼ βZð1 αZÞ. Hence
Z ¼ 12α 1
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 4αu
β
s" #
: (17)
In general Z  Zþ. If Zu <Z <Zþ, no new intersections can be created by restricting the
X-population, and any existing equilibrium does not change. If Z <Zu <Zþ, then no new
intersections can be created by restricting the X-population, and the existing equilibrium will
change. But if Z <Zþ <Zu (the case shown in Figure 6), then we may be able to produce new
population mixes.
Our aim is to find a curve in the ðα; βÞ plane that separates regions where a new stable integrated
population mix is possible by limiting the X-population from regions where it is not. Points on this
curve must satisfy
Xe ¼ u ¼ β4α ; Ze ¼ Zu ¼ Z ¼ Zþ ¼
1
2α
; (18)
which happens when
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β ¼ 2ðα
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
α2  2α
p
Þ: (19)
Now suppose that we do not the restrict the X-population, but that the Z-population is restricted to
Z ¼ v, where v 2 ð0; 1αÞ. Similar reasoning as before shows that we need
v<
1
4
for the limiting of the Z-population to have any effect. When Z ¼ v, we have that Xv ¼ βvð1 αvÞ
and the line Z ¼ v crosses the X-population tolerance limit where
X ¼ 12 1
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 4vp
h i
: (20)
Then the curve in the ðα; βÞ plane that separates regions where a new stable integrated population
mix is possible by limiting the Z-population from regions where it is not given by
Xe ¼ Xu ¼ X ¼ Xþ ¼ 1
α
; Ye ¼ v ¼ 14 ; (21)
which happens when
β ¼ 8
4 α : (22)
Results (19) and (22) are shown in Figure 7. New population mixes can be created to the right of the
blue curve, given by (19), by restricting the X-population and to the left of the red curve, given by
(22), by restricting the Z-population.
Stability of new equilibria
Even though we may be able to create new population mixes by limiting a particular population, we
do not know if that new mix is stable or not. We shall now answer that question.
When X ¼ u, the dynamics of the Z-population is governed by
Figure 6. Limiting the X-population: The case when u < b4a and Z− < Z+ < Zu.
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_Z ¼ βZð1 αZÞ  u½ Z: (23)
The stability of the equilibrium Z ¼ Z of (23) is determined by the eigenvalue
λu ¼
β
2α
ð1 4αu
β
Þ 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 4αu
β
s" #
: (24)
For u 2 ½0; β4α, we can see that λu >< 0. So Zþ is always stable, and Z is always unstable. Hence, if we
are able to restrict the X-population (so we choose α; β to the right of the blue curve in Figure 7), we
will always produce a new population mix that is always stable.
When Z ¼ v, the dynamics of the X-population is governed by
_X ¼ Xð1 XÞ  v½ X: (25)
The stability of the equilibrium X ¼ X of (25) is determined by the eigenvalue
λv ¼
1
2
ð1 4vÞ  ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ1 4vph i: (26)
For v 2 ½0; 14, we can see that λv >< 0. So Xþ is always stable, and X is always unstable. Hence, if we
are able to restrict the Z-population (so we choose α; β to the left of the red curve in Figure 7), we
will always produce a new population mix that is always stable.
Tolerance limits
The tolerance limits are shown in Figure 8, at each of the four points (a), (b), (c), and (d) of Figure 7(a).
In each case, when both populations are unrestricted, the only stable equilibria are fully segregated;
there are no stable integrated population mix. In this section, we demonstrate how a limit on
population can produce a new stable population mix.
In Figure 8, we have introduced candidate cut-off values X ¼ u and Y ¼ v are shown as black
dashed lines. To introduce new fixed points, we must have u< 12αRYð 12αÞ or v< 12RXð12Þ, that is, the
limit of one type must intersect the nullcline of the other type. There are two such lines in Figure 8
Figure 7. New population mixes can be created to the right of the blue curves, given by (19), by restricting the X-population and
to the left of the red curves, given by (22), by restricting the Z-population. (a) The tolerance limits at the four points labelled (a),
(b), (c), and (d) are shown in Figure 8. The black curves are from Figure 2. (b) Detail around the point P: (a, b) = (3, 9).
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(b) and one each in Figure 8(a,d). Basins of attraction are colored as in Figure 5 and, in Figure 8(c),
we have two stable mixed states, with basins of attraction colored white and gray.
We can create up to seven new equilibria as a result of limiting numbers when α and β lie in the
lozenge-shaped region containing in Figure 7(b), by choosing u and v accordingly (not shown).
Different tolerance schedules
The use of linear tolerance schedules, as in Figure 1(a), simplifies the analysis. But quantitative
results (Clark, 1991) show that modifications to the linear tolerance schedule may better describe the
social context. Schelling (Schelling, 1971, Figures 25-29) also used nonlinear tolerance schedules.
In this section, we show how our approach can be modified to take account of different tolerance
schedules, and we study the resulting dynamics. All possible tolerance schedules must satisfy
RXð0Þ ¼ 1; RXð1Þ ¼ 0; RYð0Þ ¼ β; RYð1kÞ ¼ 0, in terms of the original populations X;Y .
After suitable scalings, our Schelling dynamical system for general tolerance schedules
RXðXÞ;RZðZÞ can be written as
_X ¼ XRXðXÞ  Z½ X
_Z ¼ ZRZðZÞ  X½ Z (27)
To find equilibria solutions ðX;ZÞ ¼ ðXe;ZeÞ, we must find positive solutions of
Figure 8. The tolerance limits at each of the four points (a), (b), (c), and (d) of Figure 7(a), with candidate cut-off values shown as a
black dashed lines. Note that k = 2 in all four examples, and basins of attraction are colored as in Figure 5, with gray used to
denote the basin of attraction of an additional stable mixed state.
12 D. J. HAW AND J. HOGAN
Ze ¼ XeRXðXeÞ;
Xe ¼ ZeRZðZeÞ: (28)
To examine the stability of these equilibria, we must calculate the eigenvalues of the Jacobian
JðX;ZÞ ¼ 2XRXðXÞ þ X
2 dRXðXÞ
dX  Z X
Z 2ZRZðZÞ þ Z2 dRZðZÞdZ  X
 !
; (19)
evaluated at ðX;ZÞ ¼ ðXe;ZeÞ. Stable population mixes will have both eigenvalues negative.
Polynomial functions
Departing from linear tolerance schedules, our simplest choice is a polynomial function. Consider
the following:
RXðXÞ ¼ RPpXðXÞ; 1 Xpð Þ;
RZðZÞ ¼ RPqZðZÞ;β 1 αqZqð Þ;
(30)
where p; q 2 Nþ are positive integers. For p ¼ q ¼ 1 we have the linear tolerance schedules (5).
Larger values of p; q give more tolerant populations.
To find equilibria, we must solve the following equation for Xe  0:
ð1Þqþ1Xpðqþ1Þþqe þ
Xq
k¼1
ð1Þk qþ 1
k
 
Xpkþqe þ Xqe þ
1
αq
Xpe þ
1 β
αqβ
¼ 0 (31)
and then ensure that Ze ¼ Xeð1 Xpe Þ is also positive. When p ¼ q ¼ 1, (31) reduces to (7).
Since (31) has pðqþ 1Þ þ q roots, it would appear that this choice of tolerance schedule could give us
more non-trivial equilibria for increased p; q. However, Descartes’ rule of signs applied to (31) shows us that
there are at most qþ 2 real positive values of Xe. But for several of these solutions, we find Ze < 0. In fact,
since the tolerance schedules are generalized parabolae, it turns out that we have only a maximum of three
solutions of (31) where both Xe > 0 and Ze > 0. Numerical methods must be used to find these solutions.
Another choice of polynomial is possible, which results in a less tolerant population. Consider
RXðXÞ ¼ RQrXðXÞ; 1 Xð Þr
RZðZÞ ¼ RQsZðZÞ;β 1 αZð Þs:
(32)
As before, the equilibria are those roots of a high order polynomial that satisfy both Xe > 0 and Ze > 0.
This polynomial is found using the multinomial theorem, and its roots must be calculated numeri-
cally. As before, we observe that we only have a maximum of three such solutions. Hence, the change
to a polynomial tolerance schedule does not produce extra integrated equilibria.
Note that the choice of functions RPpXðXÞ;RPqZðZÞ;RQrXðXÞ;RQsZðZÞ is not unique.
Exponential functions
Another possible tolerance schedule involves the use of exponential functions. Consider
RXðXÞ ¼ REμXðXÞ; 11eμ eμX  eμð Þ
RZðZÞ ¼ REνZðZÞ; β1eνα eνZ  e
ν
α
 
;
(33)
where μ; ν> 0. Equilibria and their stability properties have to be calculated numerically.
Figure 9 illustrates the effect of exponential tolerance schedules, in terms of the original X;Y
populations. In Figure 9(a), we take RE4X and RE
4
Y , with a ¼ b ¼ 10 and k ¼ 1. In Figure 9(b), we
revert to a linear tolerance schedule for the Y-population, taking RE4X; RP
1
Y ; a ¼ b ¼ 10; k ¼ 1. We
observe that changing the tolerance schedule of one population, so that they become more tolerant,
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can result in the loss of a stable mixed state. We can understand this phenomenon by considering an
initial condition ðX0;Y0Þ that lies close to the peak of the X-nullcline. The key is that _Y has changed
sign from negative to positive at ðX0;Y0Þ. We can interpret this intuitively as follows: “some Ys
wanted to leave, but now they’re more tolerant, they’re happy to stay. In fact, Ys are so happy that Ys
come in, which makes Xs want to leave.”
For further examples of phase portraits with different tolerance schedules, the reader is referred to
the PhD thesis of the first author (https://www.imperial.ac.uk/people/d.haw/research.html).
Discussion, conclusions, and further work
We have taken Schelling’s (Schelling, 1969, 1971) bounded neighborhood model (BNM) and derived
a fully predictive dynamical system (5). We attach social meaning to each of the terms in the
governing equations. The basic principles can be illustrated by using the linear tolerance schedule. In
this case, the dynamical system (5) is given in an expanded form by
_X ¼ X2  X3  XZ
_Z ¼ βZ2  αβZ3  XZ: (34)
Let us consider the first equation in (34). The term X2 represents growth of the X-population, as it
enters the neighborhood, unhindered by lack of space or the presence of the Z-population. It is a
measure of the intrinsic popularity of the neighborhood. The term X3 represents a decay in the
X-population, corresponding to a reduction in available space in the neighborhood as the population
expands, brought about by the finite size of the neighborhood. The term XZ represents a decay in the
X-population induced by the presence of Z-population. Similar considerations apply to the Z-popu-
lation dynamics, given by the second equation in (34).
The categorization of all possible equilibria and the partitioning of phase-space into basins of attraction
allow us to describe the dynamics of segregation with respect to key parameters of the system. Saddle points
are a common feature and yield dynamics that are fundamentally different to the intuitive description given
in Schelling’s paper. Many additional variants of the BNM are possible, including the use of nonlinear
tolerance schedules, limiting the total population present, and limiting the ratio X=Y . The analytic
intractability of such systems means that a computational approach is then necessary. Further work
involves generalizing Schelling’s BNM to describe systems of neighboring geographical areas and the
flow of populations between them. Also, access to demographic data with multiple time points may help to
derive realistic parameter estimates and tolerance schedules.
Figure 9. Phase portraits demonstrating that a globally more tolerant minority population can eliminate a stable mixed state.
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